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I AM HE AS YOU ARE HE AS YOU ARE ME: 
BEING ABLE TO BE YOURSELF, 
PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF  
IDENTITY ONLINE 
Wesley Burrell* 
Arguing for an individual’s right to integrity of identity online, this 
Note advocates rolling back broad immunity for Internet service 
providers (ISPs) under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act as 
interpreted in Zeran v. America Online, Inc. Exploring the theoretical 
foundation and modern application of the right of publicity, this Note 
reasons that traditional right-to-privacy notions support a right to 
control one’s identity online, recognition of which is necessary in the 
Web 2.0 era. Because ISPs are the greatest beneficiaries of Web 2.0’s 
identity-driven structure and are in the best position to aid users in 
regulating their online identities, ISPs must be made to bear a greater 
portion of the burden to protect users and maintain an environment of 
safe interaction online. This Note concludes with a proposal for 
accomplishing this. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, Americans have seen an unprecedented 
increase in integration between the online and offline worlds. 
Internet usage is increasingly ubiquitous,1 its nature more and more 
interactive and participatory.2 The twentieth-century Internet was 
conceived primarily as an information-providing platform with users 
on the receiving end.3 Online activity was predominately fit to that 
conception—akin to viewing television or reading a book. Today, by 
contrast, users log more online hours using interactive social media 
than they spend passively receiving prepackaged information and 
entertainment.4 They are communicating, self-expressing, and 
contributing to the development of culture and community, and they 
are doing so with more ease and frequency than they ever did 
before.5 Beneficially, this allows them to engage with society, enrich 
themselves, and impact others like never before.6 But there is a dark 
side as well. This shift in Internet usage brings an attendant shift in 
the relationship between the virtual world online and the real world 
offline, which increases the risk and danger associated with Internet 
use. Current law does not provide adequate protection against this 
dark side. 
To illustrate the dark side of the interconnected online and 
offline worlds, consider the facts of Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.7 In early 
2005, the unsuspecting Cecilia Barnes began to receive phone calls 
and emails from strangers soliciting sex.8 They called her at work 
and even solicited her in person.9 They assumed that she wanted the 
 
 1. See United States of America Internet Usage and Broadband Usage Report, INTERNET 
WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/us.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2010) (noting 
that in 2009, 74.1 percent of the U.S. population used the Internet); Christina Warren, Average 
Internet User Now Spends 68 Hours Per Month Online, MASHABLE (Oct. 14, 2009), 
http://mashable.com/2009/10/14/net-usage-nielsen. 
 2. Enid Burns, More Time Spent Online Communicating Than Getting Entertained, CLICKZ 
(Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.clickz.com/3632986. 
 3. Tim O’Reilly, What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next 
Generation of Software, O’REILLY (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/a/6228. 
 4. Enid Burns, Study: Social Media’s Hot, Entertainment’s Not, CLICKZ (Dec. 12, 2008), 
http://www.clickz.com/3632063. 
 5. Burns, supra note 2. 
 6. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); infra note 27. 
 7. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 8. Id. at 1098. 
 9. Id. 
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attention, that she had requested it. Finally, Barnes discovered the 
cause: someone had posted a personal ad soliciting casual sex on 
Yahoo! Personals (“Yahoo”) with her name and contact 
information.10 The ad had been posted without her knowledge or 
permission and was viewable by Internet users all over the world.11 It 
displayed nude photos of her taken without her knowledge and listed 
personal information including her email, work address, and phone 
number.12 The anonymous poster had also conducted online 
discussions in Yahoo chat rooms.13 Posing as Barnes, the poster 
propositioned men and directed them to the fake personal ad for 
further information and interaction.14 Using Barnes’s fraudulently 
misappropriated identity, the poster actively solicited strangers to 
unwittingly harass Barnes.15 
Upon discovery of the fraudulent profile, and having no other 
recourse against the anonymous poster, Barnes followed Yahoo’s 
official policy for requesting removal of web content.16 She mailed 
Yahoo a copy of her photo ID, a signed statement denying her 
involvement with the profile, and a request for Yahoo to remove the 
profile.17 Nevertheless, the profile remained.18 For months, Barnes 
mailed requests for removal with no results.19 Yahoo did not respond 
until a local news program prepared to air a report on the story.20 
Yahoo’s Director of Communications called Barnes personally and 
asked her to fax copies of all previous requests for removal.21 The 
director promised to “take care of it” personally.22 Barnes faxed the 
correspondence and, relying on the director’s reassurance, took no 
further action.23 Yet, two months passed, the profile remained active, 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1098–99. 
 21. Id. at 1099. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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and harassment continued.24 Not until Barnes sued Yahoo did the 
profile disappear.25 
Sadly, Barnes’s predicament is not an anomaly.26 This form of 
harassment is common in today’s online culture.27 Even children 
have been its victims.28 But harassment and the danger of assault are 
not the only consequences of identity misappropriation. Whenever 
online impersonators post unauthorized images, unapproved personal 
information, or other fraudulent source-identifying content, such 
postings are potentially detrimental to a victim’s online persona and 
can have dangerous and destructive effects offline as well.29 
Additionally, because many Internet applications now track an 
individual’s online identity to increase functionality and precision,30 
dilution resulting from misappropriation can impair the functionality 
of user-driven applications and, in some cases, drive victims offline 
entirely.31 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Eric Goldman, 47 USC 230 Trifecta of Cases—Friendfinder, e360insight, iBrattleboro, 
TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 28, 2008, 10:27 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/ 
2008/04/47_usc_230_trifecta.htm (“Fake dating profiles have been the source of a fair amount of 
230 litigation . . . .”); see, e.g., Fighter Team, Internet Harassment & Revenge Is a Crime, 
EXPOSING ONLINE PREDATORS & CYBERPATHS (Aug. 7, 2010, 7:21 PM), 
http://cyberpaths.blogspot.com/2009/02/internet-harassment-revenge-is-crime.html (recounting 
the story of “Pilar Stofega, 34, [who] spent hours crafting fake profiles about her ex-boyfriend’s 
wife and posting them online”). 
 27. See, e.g., Landry-Bell v. Various, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-1526, 2005 WL 3640448, at *1 
(W.D. La. 2005) (representing a case with facts nearly identical to those of Barnes); Telling the 
Difference Between Flaming, Cyber-Bullying and Harassment and Cyberstalking (A Guide for 
Law Enforcement), STOP CYBERBULLYING, http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/lawenforcement/ 
telling_the_difference.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (listing as examples of cyber-bullying: 
“[r]egistering [someone else’s] name and setting up a bash Web site or profile,” “[m]asquerading 
as [someone else] for any purpose,” and “[p]osting [someone’s] . . . cell phone number online to 
encourage abuse and increase . . . charges”). 
 28. Christina Chatalian, Cyber Stalker Terrorizing Family, CNYCENTRAL.COM (Feb. 15, 
2008, 7:10 PM), http://www.cnycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=96646 (describing a 2008 case 
where an anonymous stranger stole pictures of a woman’s twelve-year-old daughter and posted 
them on the Internet in a fake profile that included her home address, personal information, and a 
professed desire to be raped by a stranger). 
 29. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 78–80 (2009) 
(citing cases where women’s names and images were purposefully posted to white supremacist 
watch sites to affect their employment opportunities). 
 30. Christopher Mims, Who Controls Identity on the Web?, TECH. REV. (May 13, 2010), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/25298/?a=f. 
 31. Citron, supra note 29, at 101. 
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While victims have sought to protect themselves against such 
violations by suing for conventional right-to-privacy torts,32 the 
strong protection of anonymous web posters and broad immunity for 
Internet service providers (ISPs) and website operators, or online 
service providers (OSPs), render traditional torts toothless. The lack 
of effective recourse against such misappropriation chills public 
discourse online, interferes with user-driven network advancements, 
and generally disrupts the increasing use of identity-syncing 
technologies. As a result, identity misappropriation hinders the utility 
and development of the Internet as a whole. It thus runs contrary to 
the societal good of a robust Internet that Congress expressly intends 
to promote.33 Nonetheless, current law fails to adequately protect 
Internet users and the integrity of their online identities. 
Management of Internet content is the central concern in 
protecting the integrity of identity online.34 The principal law 
governing Internet content management is § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA). Section 230 grants ISPs 
immunity from publisher liability for content posted by third parties, 
stating that “[n]o provider . . . of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”35 The 1997 
Fourth Circuit ruling in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.36 construed 
§ 230 immunity broadly.37 The court there read § 230’s grant of 
immunity to encompass not only publisher liability but also notice-
based distributor liability.38 Subsequent to Zeran, courts have 
generally adopted its reasoning and applied broad immunity to both 
ISPs and OSPs, shielding them from nearly all liability with respect 
 
 32. See, e.g., Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (D.N.H. 2008) 
(discussing plaintiff bringing various privacy tort claims, including invasion of privacy, 
defamation, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of right to 
publicity). 
 33. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2) (2006) (“It is the policy of the United States—(1) to promote 
the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other 
interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for 
the Internet and other interactive computer services . . . .”). 
 34. See id. § 230(b). 
 35. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 36. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 37. Id. at 332–33. 
 38. Id. at 332 (“The simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one from an original 
publisher to a distributor in the eyes of the law.”). 
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to content posted by third parties.39 Such broad immunity leaves 
victims of identity infringement, such as Barnes, with no means to 
compel ISPs or OSPs to remove tortious or misappropriating content 
from their websites. 
Furthermore, ISPs have little incentive to collect and maintain 
the Internet protocol (IP) addresses40 of anonymous posters who may 
have posted infringing material on their websites.41 Those ISPs that 
do maintain this data routinely clear their records, some as frequently 
as every sixty days.42 Thus, victims have a very limited time during 
which to compel an ISP to disclose a third-party poster’s identity, 
and they often fail in their efforts to do so.43 The resulting system 
grants ISPs all but total immunity, grants anonymous harassers a sort 
of de facto immunity, and leaves victims to absorb the expenses and 
injuries that result from the infringing posts. To deter identity 
infringement and uphold the societal interest in a robust Internet, 
users must be granted legal leverage against ISPs to compel the 
removal of infringing posts and to deter third-party posters. This 
leverage would be both consistent with Congress’s aim and intent 
that underlie the CDA and is consistent with the plain language of 
§ 230, which does not address notice-based distributor liability. 
The current legal scheme is premised on an understanding of the 
Internet that is nearly fifteen years out of date. When the Zeran court 
interpreted publisher liability to include notice-based distributor 
liability, it did so with a different Internet in mind. Unlike 1997’s 
Internet, today’s Internet is ubiquitous and integral to contemporary 
 
 39. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe v. 
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008). 
 40. “An IP address is a unique, electronic number which specifically identifies a device 
(often a computer) connected to the Internet.” Tara E. Lynch, Good Samaritan or Defamation 
Defender? Amending the Communications Decency Act to Correct the Misnomer of § 230 . . . 
Without Expanding ISP Liability, 19 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 18 (2008) (citation 
omitted), available at http://sstlr.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/lynch-final-version.pdf. 
 41. Citron, supra note 29, at 118 (noting that broad immunity “eliminate[s] incentives for 
better behavior” as operators have no reason to “collect and retain the identities of posters”). 
 42. Where Is Your Data?, ISP DATA RETENTION (July 7, 2008), 
http://whereismydata.wordpress.com/tag/isp-data-retention; see also, e.g., Lynch, supra note 40, 
at 15 (discussing how the plaintiff in Zeran could not identify the John Doe who defamed him 
because AOL failed to maintain adequate user records). 
 43. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Expedited Discovery, Doe 
I v. Ciolli, 611 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D. Conn. Jan. 24, 2008) (No. 3:07-cv-909(CFD)) [hereinafter 
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum], available at http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/ 
WSJ_DEF_MemoofLawreM_012408.pdf. 
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culture.44 The Zeran court could not have anticipated the 
participatory nature of twenty-first century cyberspace and the 
degree to which identity is an integral component of its functionality. 
Today, “network effects from user contributions are the key,” and a 
multi-user, collaborative approach to content creation and 
development is the model for success on the Internet and with other 
networking technologies—a paradigm that has been dubbed 
“Web 2.0.”45 It is not merely a matter of the more the merrier. In 
today’s online environment, interactivity and the participation of 
myriad diverse users are central to the Internet’s success.46 User 
security and autonomy of identity are therefore of fundamental 
importance. The law must protect users or it will impede the 
Internet’s continuing development by failing to facilitate plentiful 
participation.47 
This Note proposes solutions to bring online protection up to 
date while maintaining an appropriate degree of ISP immunity. This 
proposal requires minimal legislation. It argues that the reality and 
trajectory of current technologies and the structure and nature of the 
Web 2.0 Internet compel a reconsideration of the dominant 
interpretation of § 230 of the CDA with regard to the original 
congressional intent. Because of the unique character of online 
identity and its impact on real-world persona, courts must recognize 
and protect the right to integrity of identity online in the same way 
that they have protected the rights to intellectual property online. 
Finally, this Note argues that Congress must enact uniform standards 
to ensure accountability for third-party posting online. Without such 
protections, individuals will remain subject to threat and continue to 
bear the bulk risk for participation in the Internet’s virtual world, 
causing online culture and its marketplace of ideas to suffer. 
 
 44. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1176 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The 
ubiquity of the Internet is undisputed.”). 
 45. O’Reilly, supra note 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 154 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The view of most 
scholars who have addressed the issue is that Zeran’s analysis of § 230 is flawed, in that the court 
ascribed to Congress an intent to create a far broader immunity than that body actually had in 
mind or is necessary to achieve its purposes. We share that view.” (citation omitted)), rev’d, 146 
P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006); see also Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293–94, 
296–97 (D.N.H. 2008) (holding operators of adult web communities could not be held liable for 
damage caused by online profile even though plaintiff suffered “emotional distress, including 
anxiety over the lingering effect the false profile”). 
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Part II will give a statement of the existing law addressing (A) 
privacy and publicity rights for individuals online; (B) ISP liability 
for third-party content; and (C) subpoena laws governing protection 
of anonymity and the disclosure of a third party’s identity. Part III 
addresses the existing law’s inadequacies and its failure to protect 
user identity online. It then discusses (A) the impact on the law 
discussed in Part II as it applies after the development of the Internet 
from the “Walled Garden” web to Web 2.0; (B) anonymity under the 
current law and the problems and benefits of anonymous speech 
when it comes to online harassment; and (C) the specific effect of 
existing law on victims of online harassment. In Part IV, this Note 
proposes changes to the existing law that will better enable 
individuals to protect their identities both online and, by extension, 
offline. Specifically, this part (A) argues from theory and common 
law for the development of an online right to integrity of identity; (B) 
proposes opening distributor liability to ISPs as an exception to 
§ 230 immunity in the particular case of a violation of an individual’s 
right to integrity of identity; (C) proposes a notice and takedown 
“safe harbor” policy for the integrity of identity exception to § 230 
immunity; (D) discusses safeguards to protect speech and limit abuse 
of the notice and takedown policy; (E) argues for limits to online 
anonymity, proposes the application of a uniform subpoena policy 
for cases of violations of the right to integrity of identity, and 
discusses the privacy and free speech concerns that may stem from 
such limits to anonymity. In Part V, this Note discusses the judicial 
and legislative steps necessary to implement the proposed policies. 
Part VI concludes. 
II.  STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW 
A.  Privacy and Publicity Rights Online 
1.  The Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity is the only right to identity that courts 
have recognized as an exception to § 230 immunity.48 Some courts 
have held that the right of publicity is an intellectual property right49 
 
 48. Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 301. However, not all courts recognize this exception. 
See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–25 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
right of publicity claims are barred by § 230). 
 49. See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123–25; see also, e.g., Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 
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that fits within the intellectual property exception to § 230.50 The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the right of publicity as an 
“[a]ppropriation of one’s name or likeness to another’s advantage.”51 
The general prima facie case has three elements: (1) the defendant 
used the plaintiff’s name, portrait, or picture; (2) for purposes of 
trade or advertising; (3) without written consent.52 Its scope varies by 
state, but “most states now protect name, voice, signature, 
photograph, and likeness, almost all facets of [an individual], 
including persona.”53 
In Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc.,54 the court held that a right 
of publicity claim is an exception to § 230 immunity.55 There, a 
woman discovered a profile on a sex site identifying her by name and 
listing other accurate biographical information.56 It included a nude 
photo with enough resemblance to her that she could be “reasonably 
identified.”57 She sued the ISPs Friendfinder Network, Inc. and 
Various, Inc. on multiple tort causes of action.58 Citing § 230, the 
New Hampshire district judge dismissed all but the right of publicity 
claim.59 He held that “the right of publicity is a widely recognized 
intellectual property right” and that it is subject to the exception for 
intellectual property claims.60 
 
302 (“[T]he right of publicity is a widely recognized intellectual property right.” (quoting 
Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006)); cf. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 
1323 n.4 (declining to decide whether § 230(e)(2) immunizes ISPs from right of publicity claims 
but noting “the right of publicity does not fit neatly into the category of tort-based lawsuits from 
which Congress sought to immunize interactive service providers”). 
 50. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”). 
 51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977); see also Eric J. Goodman, A 
National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. 
ART & ENT. L. 227, 232 (1999) (noting that the right of publicity is recognized directly in the 
common law of sixteen states with corollaries in the right to privacy or unfair competition in most 
others). 
 52. Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 307, 308 (N.Y. 1984). 
 53. Oren J. Warshavsky, The Expanding Right of Publicity, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., 
Feb. 2006, at 32, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view& 
artMonth=September&artYear=2008&EntryNo=4209. 
 54. 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008). 
 55. Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 291. 
 56. Id. at 292. 
 57. Id. (noting that despite the resemblance, plaintiff claimed photo was not of her). 
 58. Id. at 291. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 302 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Prior to and contrary to this 2008 ruling, the Ninth Circuit had 
held in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC61 that “[a]s a practical matter, 
inclusion of rights protected by state law within the ‘intellectual 
property’ exemption would fatally undermine the broad grant of 
immunity provided by the CDA.”62 As a result, the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that the right of publicity, trade defamation, unfair competition, 
and dilution, among other state intellectual property rights, were not 
exempted by § 230(e)(2).63 The court in Friendfinder explicitly 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, stating that the plain language 
of § 230(e)(2) exempted right of publicity claims and that this was 
“the general consensus before . . . Perfect 10.”64 It additionally noted 
that allowing such claims to survive would not “have a ‘devastating’ 
impact on the [I]nternet,” and that “both the [I]nternet and so-called 
‘e-commerce’ remain alive and well, and show no signs of imminent 
collapse.”65 The Ninth Circuit has determined that § 230 immunizes 
ISPs against the right of publicity, but in most jurisdictions this 
remains an open question. 
The right of publicity grew out of the right to privacy,66 which 
was originally devised to protect an individual’s right to be “let 
alone.”67 The progenitors of the right to privacy identified the 
emotional harm caused by unwanted public exposure and argued that 
it should be a compensable injury.68 They argued that privacy rights 
were neither contractual nor property rights but rather “rights as 
against the world.”69 The right of publicity was an expansion of the 
right to privacy, covering cases where public figures sought relief for 
unwanted public exposure.70 Finding damage due to infringement of 
the right to be “let alone” seemed nonsensical when applied to 
 
 61. 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 62. Id. at 1119. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 301. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 167 (1993) (“The right of publicity was created not so much from 
the right of privacy as from frustration with it.”). 
 67. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
200 n.2 (1890). 
 68. Id. at 193, 197. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 225, 228 (2005). 
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plaintiffs, such as celebrities, who had made a career of seeking 
public exposure.71 Thus, the right of publicity was based on 
appropriation of one’s identity rather than on its public exposure, and 
it is distinguishable from other privacy rights in that respect—that is, 
the basis of harm is in the loss of economic associative value in the 
individual’s identity.72 But despite the right of publicity’s basis in the 
underlying market value of identity, the majority of courts do not 
distinguish plaintiffs based on that value.73 The majority view is that 
“non-celebrities have a right of publicity” despite the very low 
economic associative value of their identities.74 Likewise, many 
commentators suggest that Lockean labor theory75 is the proper 
theoretical mechanism for justifying right of publicity claims and 
distinguishing claimants.76 Yet this theory, though generally 
accepted, is problematic when compared to the functional application 
of the right of publicity discussed in Part IV.A. 
2.  Defamation, Libel, and Intermediary Liability 
Defamation predates the right to privacy, and it is also 
implicated in most cases of online identity misappropriation.77 
Contrary to disagreement about § 230’s application to the right of 
publicity, courts agree that § 230 immunizes ISPs against defamation 
claims.78 The elements of a defamation claim vary slightly but 
usually consist of “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning 
another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third-party; (3) fault 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4:16 (2d ed. 2000). 
 74. Id. 
 75. McKenna, supra note 70, at 230. 
 76. See Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE 
L.J. 383, 388 (1999) (arguing that the theoretical basis for the right of publicity is that economic 
value in identity should be allocated to a claimant because the value is primarily the result of the 
claimant’s own labor). 
 77. E.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
 78. Ben Quarmby, Protection from Online Libel: A Discussion and Comparison of the Legal 
and Extrajudicial Recourses Available to Individual and Corporate Plaintiffs, 42 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 275, 282 n.24 (2008); cf. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Ct. App. 2004) (“We 
agree with appellants that the statute cannot be deemed to abrogate the common law principle that 
one who republishes defamatory matter originated by a third person is subject to liability if he or 
she knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character. By construing section 230 as 
conferring an absolute immunity, the trial court erred.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)), 
rev’d, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
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amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) 
either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or 
the existence of special harm caused by the publication.”79 
Defamation law recognizes the torts of libel, for defamatory 
statements published in a fixed medium, and slander, for spoken 
defamatory statements.80 Because online speech occurs in a fixed 
medium, defamatory online speech is considered libel.81 
Under libel law, there are two ways to hold an intermediary 
liable. The first is publisher liability,82 which holds that “one who 
repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to 
liability as if he had originally published it.”83 Traditionally publisher 
liability applied to newspaper publishers, book publishers, 
broadcasters, and the like.84 Courts applied liability to these 
publishers because the publishers commonly had a good deal of 
editorial control and discretion over content.85 This editorial review 
process has resulted in a public perception that the publishers or 
broadcasters had “adopted the [defamatory] statements as [their] 
own.”86 Section 230 expressly provides immunity to ISPs from 
liability as a publisher.87 
The alternative form of intermediary libel liability is distributor 
liability. Distributor liability differs from publisher liability in that 
distributors are considered passive in the conveyance of the 
defamatory statement since there is no editorial process.88 Thus, a 
distributor is liable for the transmission of a defamatory statement 
only if the distributor “knows or has reason to know of its 
defamatory character.”89 Section 230 does not explicitly provide 
 
 79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). 
 80. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 934, 1421 (8th ed. 2004). 
 81. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1157, 1164–65 (2006) (noting that some scholars argue online speech, 
particularly blogging, should be regarded as slander rather than libel). 
 82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online 
Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 144 (2008). 
 85. Id. at 144–45. 
 86. Id. at 145 (alteration in original). 
 87. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
 88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977). 
 89. Id. 
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immunity to ISPs from distributor liability. Indeed, it does not 
mention distributor liability. 
Finally, common carriers such as telephone companies have 
traditionally been immune from liability.90 Common carriers usually 
cannot control the statements transmitted over their networks and are 
required to serve all customers.91 Therefore, courts have typically 
held that common carriers cannot be liable for the defamatory 
statements of others made over their networks.92 Despite some 
similar characteristics, ISPs are not considered common carriers 
because they can refuse to serve customers.93 
Zeran v. America Online, Inc.94 established the contemporary 
interpretation of CDA immunity, granting broad protection from 
liability to ISPs.95 The court went beyond the plain language of the 
statute in interpreting the breadth of immunity and construed it to 
include immunity for distributors as well as publishers.96 Thus, under 
Zeran, even when an ISP or OSP has notice of tortious content on its 
server or webpage, it has no obligation to remove that content.97 
Unlike the right to privacy and right of publicity, defamation did 
not develop as a positive right to be “let alone” or to control one’s 
identity; rather, it developed as a negative right against “an assault on 
a person’s reputation,” which was considered “an assault on the 
entire community.”98 The First Amendment does not protect 
defamatory speech.99 Nonetheless, First Amendment protections 
compel substantial limits on state defamation laws to protect against 
the possible chilling effect on speech that such laws may engender.100 
This policy consideration contributes to courts’ reasoning that § 230 
 
 90. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 145. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 146. 
 94. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 95. Id. at 332. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Kate Silbaugh, Comment, Sticks and Stones Can Break My Name: Nondefamatory 
Negligent Injury to Reputation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 866 (1992). 
 99. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 100. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 159. 
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ought to be construed as broadly as possible in the defamation 
realm.101 
B.  Section 230 of the CDA and ISP Immunity 
The CDA was passed in response to rising concerns about the 
availability of pornography online as the Internet developed.102 It 
took two divergent approaches to policing online content: (1) a direct 
set of government-enforced criminal limitations on online activity, 
which the Supreme Court struck down within a year of the statute’s 
enactment;103 and (2) a hands-off, Internet exceptionalist approach of 
§ 230, which survives today.104 Congress passed § 230 for two stated 
reasons: first, to protect “Good Samaritan[]” ISPs and OSPs “who 
take[] steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their 
customers”; and second, to establish a policy against online content 
regulation by the federal government.105 
There are two immunity provisions in § 230.106 The first protects 
providers or users of Internet services (ISPs or OSPs) from treatment 
as a publisher or a speaker with regard to information posted by 
another content provider.107 The second gives immunity to providers 
or users who make a good faith effort to restrict others’ access to 
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable” content.108 Section 230 was passed as a 
direct response to the ruling in Stratton-Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services, Co.,109 where an ISP was held liable as a publisher because 
it had been vetting its online content of obscene materials.110 The 
statute was passed specifically to overrule Stratton-Oakmont, in the 
 
 101. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[C]ourts construing § 230 
have recognized as critical in applying the statute the concern that lawsuits could threaten the 
‘freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.’” (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 
330)). 
 102. Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility?: Lessons from 
the DMCA Applied to Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237, 249 (2007). 
 103. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 885 (1997). 
 104. Medenica & Wahab, supra note 102, at 251–52. 
 105. 141 CONG. REC. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Sen. Cox). 
 106. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). 
 107. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 108. Id. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 109. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509, § 230, 110 Stat. 56, 137. 
 110. Id. at *5. 
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hopes of encouraging ISPs to pursue their own online-content 
regulation and explore methods and technologies for protecting users 
from dangerous or obscene content.111 Since its passage § 230, 
though initially intended to encourage ISPs to self-regulate, has 
become a shield from liability even when ISPs attempt no regulation 
whatsoever—immunizing them even when they work against content 
regulation of any kind.112 
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. was decided a year after Congress 
passed the CDA.113 The case concerned postings on an America 
Online (AOL) message board that advertised T-shirts with slogans 
expressing support for the Oklahoma City Bomber.114 The shirt sales 
were fraudulently attributed to Ken Zeran.115 Facing a high volume of 
angry calls, and even death threats, Zeran requested that AOL take 
down the posts, but despite AOL’s efforts, the posts remained 
online.116 Zeran therefore sued AOL for “unreasonable delay” in 
removing the posts.117 Zeran attempted to work around § 230 
publisher immunity by arguing that AOL was subject to distributor 
liability because it had notice of the defamatory posting.118 The court 
dismissed Zeran’s argument, however, stating that distributor 
liability was “merely a subset . . . of publisher liability, and is 
therefore also foreclosed by § 230.”119 The court went on to explain 
that in defamation law the distinction between distributors and 
publishers relates only to when liability attaches—before or after 
notice.120 However, irrespective of when liability attaches, the court 
reasoned that any liable intermediary is liable as a publisher; § 230, 
therefore, applies to every intermediary ISP.121 
 
 111. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 
208. 
 112. Medenica & Wahab, supra note 102, at 252. 
 113. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 114. Id. at 329. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 328. 
 118. Id. at 329–31. 
 119. Id. at 332. 
 120. Id. at 331–32. 
 121. Id. at 332 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 113, at 802 (5th ed. 1984)). 
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Zeran laid out a three-part test for establishing immunity that 
has since become the predominant interpretation of § 230.122 The ISP 
must show that (1) it acted as a user or provider of an interactive 
computer service; (2) the plaintiff seeks to hold it liable “as the 
publisher or speaker” of information furnished “by another 
information content provider”; and (3) it was not the “information 
content provider” of the content at issue.123 The Zeran court 
precluded distributor liability despite the lack of any explicit 
statutory language to support this determination and, in so doing, 
possibly went beyond Congress’s original intent.124 
After Zeran, the Ninth Circuit further expanded the scope of 
immunity by expanding the definition of who or what qualifies as an 
ISP.125 In Batzel v. Smith,126 the court ruled that “the definition of 
‘interactive computer service’ on its face covers ‘any’ information 
services or other systems, as long as the service or system allows 
‘multiple users’ to access ‘a computer server.’”127 The defendant 
intermediary was the manager of an email listserv who had 
forwarded allegedly defamatory email messages to the listserv.128 The 
court found the listserv manager immune as an ISP under § 230.129 
Similarly, in 2006, the California Supreme Court held in Barrett v. 
Rosenthal130 that republishing information did not make one an 
information content provider.131 It found that although the defendant 
had no actual supervisory role in operating the Internet site on which 
she had posted an allegedly defamatory email, she was nonetheless 
held to be immune as an ISP and OSP.132 
 
 122. Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran v. 
America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 586 (2008). 
However, the opinion is not without controversy. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 
154 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The view of most scholars who have addressed the issue is that Zeran’s 
analysis of section 230 is flawed . . .”), rev’d, 146 P.3d 510 (2006). 
 123. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
 124. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 149–50. 
 125. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1021. 
 129. Id. at 1032. 
 130. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
 131. Id. at 515. 
 132. Id. 
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The legislative history does not indicate whether Congress 
intended the immunity granted to ISPs to likewise apply to Internet 
users, webpage creators, and general posters of third-party-created 
content in the sense applied in Barrett.133 Indeed, the Barrett panel 
itself noted that “[i]ndividual Internet ‘users’ like Rosenthal . . . are 
situated differently from institutional service providers with regard to 
some of the principal policy considerations discussed by the Zeran 
court and reflected in the Congressional Record.”134 Users are not 
faced with the volume of third-party postings that providers are and, 
furthermore, self-regulation for users is “far less challenging.”135 
Nonetheless, the court extended immunity. 
To understand courts’ persistence in broadly construing § 230 
immunity, it is important to consider the policy underlying the 
CDA’s initial passage. The CDA was enacted in 1996 because 
Congress feared that the available communications laws were out of 
date and failed to cover the rapidly expanding Internet.136 It was 
enacted to regulate indecency on the Internet and originally included 
only proactive regulatory measures prohibiting distribution of 
obscene materials online to minors.137 Section 230 was proposed for 
the same purpose but with a different philosophy—a carrot to the 
proactive measures’ stick—to encourage ISPs to take the initiative in 
self-regulation of obscene and offensive materials.138 The statute 
itself proclaims this intention “to ensure vigorous enforcement of 
Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, 
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”139 In addition to 
this policy purpose, Congress also expressed an intention “to 
promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media [and] to 
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market . . . unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation.”140 
 
 133. Ciolli, supra note 84, at 152. 
 134. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 526. 
 135. Id. 
 136. 141 CONG. REC. 15,502 (1995) (statement of Sen. Exon). 
 137. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858–61 (1997). 
 138. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 139. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) (2006). 
 140. Id. § 230(b)(1)–(2). 
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Following Zeran, courts have interpreted Congress’s intent 
behind the CDA solely to favor freedom and deregulation in online 
policy, and they have done so at the expense of Congress’s equally 
stated intention to fight online obscenity, stalking, and harassment. 
As a result, courts have nearly extinguished protections against 
online harassment and stalking, and they have allowed the killer 
combination of ISP immunity and user anonymity to all but eliminate 
safeguards and recourse for online conduct.141 This one-sided policy 
results in a “user beware” Internet. 
Rather than directly address the problems spawned by broadly 
construed § 230 immunity, courts have made exceptions in limited 
circumstances.142 However, these exceptions are ineffective to 
combat the problem of broad immunity. For example, in Barnes, the 
case discussed in this Note’s Introduction, the exception that the 
Ninth Circuit established actually weakened user identity protection 
with its promissory estoppel exception.143 The court reasoned that 
estoppel liability survived § 230 because it was sufficiently distinct 
from publisher liability.144 An ISP in the Ninth Circuit now risks 
losing § 230 immunity if it discusses the possibility of removing 
offensive content with a complaining victim.145 Though this was a 
victory for Barnes, it was a blow to future victims of online identity 
misappropriation. The ruling in Barnes discourages ISPs from 
responding to victims of misappropriation about potentially 
infringing or offensive posts lest the ISPs open themselves to 
 
 141. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2009); Batzel v. 
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 142. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding an ISP liable for third-party content when its online application form for housing 
induced posters to enter unconstitutionally prejudicial content); see also Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 
651 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (allowing an exception for state “right of publicity” claims 
predicated on the statutory intellectual property exception from § 230(e)(2)). But see Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that immunity must be broadly 
construed to ensure courts do not “undermine” the immunity provided by the CDA). 
 143. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1109. Barnes brought two claims in her complaint against Yahoo: 
negligent undertaking and promissory estoppel. Id. at 1098. The court dismissed the first but 
permitted the second. Id. at 1105–06, 1109. 
 144. Id. (noting liability came “not from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s 
manifest intention to be legally obligated to do something, which happen[ed] to be removal of 
material from publication”). 
 145. Id. at 1107. 
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liability.146 In this way, the exception further frustrates victims’ 
ability to compel ISPs to remove infringing content. 
Some commentators have suggested that courts’ tendency to 
make exceptions to broad immunity reveals a trend away from 
“Internet exceptionalism.”147 The majority opinion in Fair Housing 
Council v. Roommates.com148 states that the Internet is “no longer a 
fragile new means of communication,” but that it has “become a 
dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through which 
commerce is conducted,” reaching into “the lives of millions.”149 The 
court concluded that, therefore, it “must be careful not to exceed the 
scope of the immunity provided by Congress and thus give online 
businesses an unfair advantage over their [offline] counterparts.”150 
Courts ought to heed this warning and take such precautions. 
C.  Subpoena Law 
As a matter of free speech, authors have a First Amendment 
right to remain anonymous.151 In Reno v. ACLU,152 the Supreme 
Court confirmed that this protection extends to online speech, noting 
that “democratic forums” online would be hindered if users could not 
maintain anonymity.153 Consequentially, courts are cautious about 
compelling the unmasking of anonymous online posters. 
Unfortunately, there is no uniform standard for issuing a subpoena to 
an ISP compelling disclosure of a poster’s identity (“John Doe 
subpoenas”).154 Different jurisdictions have different tests.155 
 
 146. Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Immoral Immunity: Using a Totality of the Circumstances 
Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 61 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1307, 1330 (2010). 
 147. Varty Defterderia, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New Path for § 230 
Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 583 (2009) (“The Rooommates.com majority no longer 
sees fit to extend the notion of cyber exceptionalism.”). 
 148. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 149. Id. at 1164 n.15. 
 150. Id. 
 151. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). 
 152. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 153. Id. at 868. 
 154. See Jason C. Miller, Who’s Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing Between Public and 
Private Figure Plaintiffs in Subpoenas and ISPs in Anonymous Online Defamation Suits, 13 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 299, 245–46 (2008). 
 155. Id. 
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Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in state courts 
that have adopted those rules, a victim must discover the identity of a 
third-party poster before he or she can proceed with a suit. However, 
in the types of cases addressed by this Note, the third-party poster 
has been anonymous. Because Rule 26(f) generally requires that the 
parties confer before a plaintiff may seek discovery, a victim-
plaintiff can satisfy this requirement only by filing an ex parte 
motion seeking a subpoena compelling the ISP to disclose the 
poster’s identity.156 This motion is necessary because an ISP cannot 
legally disclose its users’ identities without a court order.157 
Most courts require court approval to issue a subpoena to a 
fictitiously named John Doe.158 A plaintiff who wishes to subpoena a 
John Doe must submit an order to show cause that includes the 
reasons that the defendant should be identified.159 Then the 
defendant’s ISP informs the defendant of the order, and he or she can 
fight it anonymously through his or her attorney if he or she so 
chooses.160 Once the plaintiff has submitted the order and the 
defendant has had an opportunity to respond, the court will 
determine whether the anonymous defendant’s identity should be 
disclosed.161 The amount and type of information that the plaintiff 
must submit in order to prevail on the motion depends on what 
standard the court uses to assess the merits of unmasking.162 There is 
great variation in what courts require, and there are seven different 
major John Doe subpoena standards that courts have distinctly 
identified and used.163 Five of these standards are applicable and will 
be discussed here. 
In 1999, Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com164 provided 
the earliest decision on this issue and developed the first of these 
 
 156. See, e.g., McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 262–63 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 157. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B) (2006). 
 158. Ryan M. Martin, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standard for 
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1217, 
1227 (2007). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1227–33. 
 163. Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 
118 YALE L.J. 320, 337, 339 (2008). 
 164. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
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standards.165 The court in Seescandy sought to balance the 
defendants’ First Amendment rights against the injured parties’ 
rights to seek recovery.166 The court also noted that “limiting” 
principles must be applied to ensure that plaintiffs are not permitted 
to unmask anonymous speakers through frivolous suits simply to 
harass or embarrass innocent parties.167 Each subsequent standard 
imposed on the issuance of John Doe subpoenas for anonymous 
online speakers has sought to balance these factors. How a court 
weighs these contravening concerns determines how difficult it will 
be for a plaintiff to unmask a Doe defendant and jurisdictions have 
balanced these concerns differently resulting in a range of standards. 
The early standards that courts issued favored plaintiffs’ 
interests over protection for anonymous online speakers.168 In 
Seescandy, the plaintiff sought a John Doe subpoena to unmask an 
anonymous alleged trademark infringer.169 The Seescandy test 
required only that the plaintiff (1) show that his or her case was 
strong enough to survive a motion to dismiss; (2) show that the 
information sought was likely to identify the defendant and, 
therefore, was relevant to the claim; and (3) disclose all steps taken 
to locate the defendant and show that a good faith effort had been 
made to serve the defendant.170 The first two factors of the Seescandy 
test, assessing the strength of the plaintiff’s case and the relevance of 
the information sought, are also found in each subsequent standard. 
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.171 
established a second standard that was even more favorable to 
plaintiffs than the Seescandy test.172 America Online was the first 
notable defamation case to address whether a John Doe subpoena can 
be issued to an anonymous Internet poster.173 The court applied a 
 
 165. Id. at 573. 
 166. Id. at 578 (noting that courts must consider “the need to provide injured parties with a 
forum in which they may seek redress for grievances,” but stating that “this need must be 
balanced against the legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums anonymously or 
pseudonymously”). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Gleicher, supra note 163, at 341. 
 169. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 575–76. 
 170. Id. at 578–79. 
 171. No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d sub nom. Am. Online, 
Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). 
 172. Id. at *8. 
 173. Lynch, supra note 40, at 19. 
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three-pronged test: (1) the court must be “satisfied by the pleadings”; 
(2) the party seeking the subpoena must have a “good faith basis” for 
the assertion that his or her allegations were actionable; and (3) the 
disclosure of the identity must be “centrally needed to advance the 
claim.”174 This deferential standard required only that the plaintiff’s 
claim be adequately specific, the defendant’s identity be adequately 
relevant, and the claim itself be made in “good faith.” 
The Rocker Management LLC v. John Does 1–20175 court took a 
stance far less deferential to plaintiffs than the standards of 
Seescandy and America Online.176 The court used a totality-of-the-
circumstances test to assess the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.177 The 
court noted the “grammar and spelling errors” on the forum in which 
the allegedly tortious statements had been posted, and it highlighted 
a forum warning message that postings therein were solely users’ 
opinions.178 Based on these findings, the court determined that a 
reasonable reader would not interpret the John Doe’s forum posts to 
have been factual assertions and, as such, the claim for libel could 
not be successful.179 The defendants’ identities remained 
undisclosed.180 Rocker heavily favors defendants by increasing the 
threshold requirements that the plaintiff must meet.181 
The first standard to include an explicit balancing test and a 
notice provision was set forth in Dendrite International v. Doe, No. 
3.182 In Dendrite, the anonymous poster had posted purportedly 
inside information about a company on an online message board.183 
The court dismissed the “good faith” approach of America Online 
and laid out a four-part “sufficient evidence” approach.184 Under this 
new approach, plaintiffs must first make an effort to notify the John 
Doe of the pending subpoena and allow sufficient time for the 
 
 174. America Online, 2000 WL 1210372, at *8. 
 175. No. 03-MC-33, 2003 WL 22149380 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2003). 
 176. Id. at *3. 
 177. Id. at *2. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *2–3. 
 180. Id. at *3 (granting motion to quash subpoena seeking disclosure of defendants’ 
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 181. Id. 
 182. 775 A.2d 756, 759–60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 183. Id. at 762–63, 767. 
 184. Lynch, supra note 40, at 21–22. 
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defendant to file an opposition.185 As an example, the court suggested 
that posting the notice on the message board where the offensive 
content had initially appeared would be sufficient.186 Second, 
plaintiffs must present to the court the exact statements allegedly 
made by the anonymous poster.187 Third, like in Seescandy, 
plaintiffs’ pleadings must be able to survive a motion to dismiss; 
however, a greater showing is required under Dendrite than is 
required under Seescandy.188 Under Dendrite, plaintiffs must produce 
“sufficient evidence” in support of each prima facie claim.189 Finally, 
the court weighs the necessity for identity disclosure in light of each 
plaintiff’s case against each defendant’s First Amendment interest in 
anonymity.190 In applying this standard to the case, the Dendrite court 
ruled that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence and, 
as such, the court would not compel disclosure of the defendant’s 
identity.191 Dendrite, like Rocker, favors anonymous defendants. It 
allows courts to consider concerns not addressed by earlier standards 
and permits judicial flexibility in determining a proper balance, 
particularly in the face of “rapidly evolving technology.”192 Courts 
have frequently used the Dendrite test to bar plaintiffs’ actions 
against John Does.193 
The fifth standard—and the third one that heavily favors speaker 
anonymity—was established in Doe v. Cahill.194 The court refused to 
adopt an approach similar to that in America Online or Seescandy, 
finding that the standards they set forth were “too easily satisfied” to 
adequately protect anonymous speech.195 Instead, the court adopted a 
standard akin to that in Dendrite, but made it a two-prong test, 
combining the balancing and disclosure-of-allegedly-tortious-
 
 185. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760. 
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 187. Id. 
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 190. Id. at 760–61. 
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 192. Gleicher, supra note 163, at 340. 
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 194. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
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statements prongs into the sufficient-evidence prong of Dendrite.196 
The Cahill court articulated its two-prong test as a summary 
judgment standard. The first prong is a notice requirement akin to 
that in Dendrite, and the second prong requires the plaintiff to 
present sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment for each element of his or her claim—a “sufficiency of 
evidence” standard.197 The court also made an exception for prima 
facie elements that would be nearly impossible to prove without 
disclosing the defendant’s identity, such as the malicious-intent 
element required in a public figure’s defamation claim.198 The Cahill 
test, like that of Dendrite, weighs so heavily in favor of protecting 
anonymous speech that it seriously hinders the protection of Internet 
users who are victims of identity misappropriation. 
Most courts have adopted a John Doe subpoena standard that is 
balanced heavily in favor of the anonymous online speaker, such as 
the Dendrite “sufficient evidence” standard or the Cahill “summary 
judgment” standard.199 For example, in Krinsky v. Doe 6,200 the court 
used a hybrid Cahill-Dendrite standard.201 The court recognized that 
the notice prong, as expressed in Cahill, may now be “unrealistic and 
unprofitable” given the nature of today’s Internet and given that an 
ISP will often notify the Doe defendant, as in Krinsky, when it 
receives a request for his or her identity.202 The court also noted that 
there was too much variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the 
application of Cahill’s summary judgment standard and, instead, 
applied a standard requiring “a prima facie showing of the elements” 
strong enough to overcome a motion to quash the subpoena seeking 
disclosure of the defendant’s identity.203 
These efforts to delineate a comprehensive standard for John 
Doe subpoenas attempt to balance multiple concerns. When courts 
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use a standard that too heavily favors one side or the other, they risk 
eliminating the non-favored rights.204 Weak protections for 
anonymity may allow plaintiffs to undertake “extra-judicial self-help 
remedies” after unmasking defendants.205 Conversely, granting 
anonymity too much deference will immunize defendants, eliminate 
deterrence, and leave plaintiffs powerless.206 Courts consider 
anonymity most critical in circumstances such as “governmental 
whistle blowing; labor organizing; dissident movements in repressive 
countries; gay and lesbian issues; and resources dealing with 
addiction, alcoholism, diseases and spousal abuse,” as well as where 
the speech at issue contributes to important public debate.207 Any 
standard designed to protect anonymous speech online should be 
particularly tailored to protect these kinds of speech. Protection 
covering speech outside of these particular circumstances, however, 
seriously risks eliminating a plaintiff’s ability to fight against 
anonymous speech that is used to terrorize and harass. 
III.  CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW 
A.  Walled Garden to Web 2.0 
ISPs and OSPs hold the key to individual autonomy in online 
identity construction. They have the power and capacity to control 
the flow and distribution of information online. Indeed, Congress 
designed the CDA to facilitate freedom for ISPs with this very fact in 
mind. However, the CDA was passed in 1996, and Zeran was 
decided in 1997. Since then, the Internet landscape has vastly 
changed, and the nature of ISP and OSP control over online 
information flow has changed with it. The expansive Zeran 
interpretation of CDA immunity no longer effectively upholds 
Congress’s purpose in passing the act. The Internet of the 1990s was 
ISP-driven, self-contained, “read only,” and accessible only to a 
minority of the population. Today’s Internet is ubiquitous, 
interactive, user-driven, and integral to societal participation in 
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political, professional, financial, and social realms. As a result, it is 
imperative that ISPs and OSPs be subject to limited distributor 
liability—lest the law be read to incentivize lawlessness online. 
Only 36 million people worldwide—0.9 percent of the world’s 
population—used the Internet in 1996, the year the CDA was 
enacted.208 Today, there are over 227 million Internet users in the 
United States alone, 77.3 percent of the U.S. population.209 During 
this period of rapid growth, the Internet has changed in both size and 
structure. When the CDA was passed, the online landscape’s 
structure was described as the walled garden web.210 That is, the 
browsing environment of the 1990s “control[led] the information and 
Web sites the user [wa]s able to access.”211 ISPs like CompuServe 
and AOL provided a self-contained environment within which users 
could surf.212 The ISPs designed their systems and services to direct 
users to supported content, creating a self-contained, walled-like 
network of webpages and applications within which most users 
remained throughout their online experience213 At AOL’s peak, 
85 percent of its subscribers never left the confines of AOL’s 
“garden.”214 On such services, web users “observed, found, and 
exchanged content passively . . . and privately, e.g., by emailing or 
engaging in person-to-person instant messages.”215 
By contrast, today’s Internet is highly searchable, very versatile, 
and extremely interactive. The advent of broadband brought down 
the walled garden dial-up system of Internet provision. Unlike ISPs 
of the walled garden era, broadband companies seek to provide 
Internet access alone, divorced from regulating or providing 
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content.216 They place few limits on the content accessible to users. 
Also, through broadband, the Internet is accessible twenty-four hours 
a day. In 2007, over 50 percent of U.S. households had broadband 
service,217 and 79 percent of adults went online for an average of 
eleven hours a week.218 These numbers have only increased.219 
Phenomena such as blogging and social networking, as well as web 
services like Google, YouTube, and Wikipedia, have revolutionized 
the way Internet content is created, organized, collected, and viewed 
and the way online communities are formed and developed. 
Additionally, hardware, such as iPhones and Blackberries, have 
made the Internet portable and accessible in ways unanticipated 
fifteen years ago. 
This interactive Internet environment, dubbed “Web 2.0,”220 
“specializes in [building] community” through its services.221 It is 
designed to “harness network effects” and improve as more people 
participate.222 In contrast to ISPs’ services in the walled garden era, 
Web 2.0 services are usually in the form of websites created and 
maintained by users and OSPs rather than in the form of content and 
sites created and maintained by the broadband ISPs themselves.223 
Additionally, Web 2.0 user interaction is increasingly public. Even 
one-to-one interactions are recorded and broadcast for public 
comment and collection by other users.224 Users broadcast their real-
world whereabouts and activities in real time from mobile devices 
and personal computers.225 They create profile pages describing 
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themselves and their activities,226 and they join networks that link 
them to professional connections where they can be rated and 
promoted to others.227 They broadcast and rate their consumption of 
books, movies, and other media on sites that track users’ likes and 
dislikes. Applications on these sites make automated 
recommendations based on users’ tastes, and send this information 
along to participating friends and connections.228 The rise of Web 2.0 
has revolutionized not only the mode of interaction and expression 
online but also the very nature and function of users’ online 
identities. 
In the walled garden web, user identity, at best, comprised a 
“crabbed description,” no more than a collection of statements or 
statistics.229 It was far from the “highly nuanced and richly 
instantiated selves we experience in more social and interactive . . . 
environments.”230 The online identities of Web 2.0 users are much 
more akin to and have many more implications on our real-world 
identities than the walled garden Internet for which the Zeran 
protections were sufficient. One’s online persona can be accessed by 
and has influence on one’s social network, including friends, family, 
and acquaintances, as well as one’s professional network, including 
colleagues, clients, employers and employees—both current and 
potential (in many fields, a clean and prominent Internet presence is 
essential for professional success).231 A person’s online persona is 
also accessible by and influential on advertisers, businesses, and 
various personalized service applications that are designed to 
integrate with and particularize to a person’s identity. As online 
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identity has become more comprehensive and more closely tied to a 
user’s real-world identity, the nature of online identity construction 
has remained versatile in its mutability and, therefore, vulnerable to 
co-opting, infringement, and fraud. 
Congress could not predict the development of the Web 2.0 
Internet, and the courts did not consider a system of this kind when 
they construed § 230 immunity so broadly. Under the Zeran system, 
there are no special provisions or incentives for ISPs or OSPs to 
protect the integrity of users’ identities or to facilitate users’ control 
over their identities. But ISPs, to some degree, and OSPs, generally, 
provide services that encourage and trade off of individualized user 
networking, socializing, and identity data collecting.232 The outcome 
of broad immunity is that ISPs and OSPs, which are in the best 
position to control takedown and editing of user-created content and 
identity construction, have little legal incentive to regulate this 
content or to protect users. ISPs and OSPs, particularly, benefit 
greatly in the Web 2.0 environment by encouraging users to create 
and maintain online content;233 yet § 230 immunity continues to 
provide them with nearly complete freedom from liability for harm 
to users caused by manipulation of their platforms and services. 
Users, therefore, bear the burden and cost. Because the general 
success of the Web 2.0 Internet depends on user interaction and 
participation, Congress’s intention to encourage innovation, 
development, and expansion of the online marketplace of ideas is 
best served by providing a safe environment for users to control and 
develop their online personas without fear of misappropriation. This 
could be accomplished by rethinking the courts’ interpretations of 
broad ISP immunity and allowing limited protection for users in 
particular cases. 
B.  Online Anonymity Protections 
Overbroad immunity, when applied to Web 2.0, facilitates 
identity misappropriation like never before. Additionally, wide-
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reaching protections for online anonymity embolden identity 
appropriators and harassers, as these perpetrators are not called to 
account for the repercussions of their actions.234 The pairing of these 
features has led to increased levels of harassment.235 Likewise, 
perpetrators’ exclusively virtual encounters with their victims—
many never meet their victims in real life—make the victims appear 
to harassers as mere images for manipulation.236 These factors are 
exacerbating harassment online. This increase in online harassment 
is compounded by the lack of uniformity in John Doe subpoena law 
and the resulting difficulty in identifying and holding anonymous 
Internet actors liable under the prevalent standards discussed supra 
Part II.C. 
In addition to the legal difficulty in obtaining a subpoena, there 
is a technical hurdle to overcome as well. Many ISPs and OSPs only 
store IP addresses—which could be necessary to identify a John 
Doe—for a period of sixty days or so.237 This limited time frame 
requires a victim to act very quickly against a misappropriator if the 
victim hopes to compel the misappropriator’s identification. It might 
help remedy this issue to instate a liability scheme against ISPs and 
OSPs that would enforce procedures for (1) notice and takedown of 
infringing posts and (2) longer-term maintenance of IP addresses for 
users. Takedown procedures would also help preserve online 
anonymity, because plaintiffs would be less likely to undertake the 
difficult process of seeking to unmask third-party posters if they had 
a more immediate remedy.238 
At the time of the walled garden Internet, anonymity was a 
bedrock aspect of Internet culture.239 A culture of anonymity and 
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pseudonymity—focused on “representation” rather than on 
“reputation”—predominated, and real-world identity was 
downplayed.240 Because online identity is as alienable as it is 
mutable, Internet users may have a variety of different identities 
online, embedding themselves in different groups and playing 
different roles.241 However, there has been a shift away from this 
culture in the Web 2.0 environment, which has been largely driven 
by technological advances.242 Software capabilities now go beyond 
the “mere naming conventions” typical of walled garden identity 
builders, such that individuals can now “create positive and robust” 
online personas.243 Thus, the modern focus of online identity is 
reputation because reputation integrates peoples’ online and offline 
identities. 
Where courts administer tougher standards for John Doe 
subpoenas, they do so in the name of protecting free speech online.244 
But the freedom to speak anonymously should not be the only free 
speech consideration. The potential chilling effect on online speech 
that may result from weaker protections for anonymity is not more 
problematic than are the chilling effects on online speech that may 
result from weak protections for those who had chosen to speak 
using their own voices in their real-world identities. Just as an 
individual’s right to speak anonymously is integral to his or her 
freedom of speech, so too is his or her right to open self-expression. 
He or she should not be forced to speak anonymously nor be subject 
to someone else putting words in his or her mouth. 
Also, anonymity can have negative effects on speech. One 
school of thought holds that people are more prone to behave 
aggressively when they believe they cannot be seen or will not be 
caught.245 This tendency has led to aggressive online harassment that 
targets women, children, and minority groups. It has also led victims 
to leave Internet discourse or resign their identities online (real or 
pseudonymous) and take on anonymity.246 As some scholars have 
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argued, the right to anonymous speech may be “better termed a 
‘qualified privilege.’”247 Anonymous speech whose primary purpose 
is to impede or eliminate others’ rights to self-expression should not 
be privileged.248 Because proper functioning of the Web 2.0 Internet 
depends on users maintaining consistent identities, with many users 
using their real-world identities for this purpose, the freedom to 
speak anonymously online must be weighed against the needs of 
Web 2.0 users to manage and control the consistency of their online 
presence and self-expression. In some circumstances, other rights 
outweigh the right to anonymity. Here, it should be outweighed by 
the individual’s right to speak with his or her own voice and 
preserved online by securing such individuals’ integrity of identity. 
C.  Victim Recourse Under Current Law 
Misuse and misappropriation of identity are common tactics in 
online harassment.249 Harassers gain access to personal and 
personally identifying information, either through Web searches of 
publicly accessible information or through actual invasions of 
privacy, by hacking into victims’ computers or email accounts.250 The 
acquired information is then posted online, either in a tone 
purporting that the harasser is the individual whose information is 
being posted, or in a way that otherwise invites third parties to 
misuse or misappropriate the information or correlating identity.251 
Once the victim discovers such a posting, he or she must contact the 
ISP or site OSP to request that the post be taken down.252 The victim 
is then subject to the whim of the ISP or OSP with respect to 
removal. Furthermore, unless the OSP’s actions or the victim’s claim 
fits within very limited exceptions that vary by jurisdiction, the OSP 
is immune from liability for the post and for any failure to remove it. 
Meanwhile, the posted material remains active, exposing the victim 
to further danger from and harassment by third parties. During this 
time, “[v]ictims feel a sustained loss of personal security and 
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regularly dismantle their online presence[s] to avoid further 
devastation of their privacy.”253 
For recourse against an anonymous poster, a victim must first 
contact the OSP for the website where the material was initially 
posted. The victim must request identifying information (if any was 
taken) or the IP address of the poster in hopes of tracing it to the 
poster’s real-world identity.254 The OSP may not have identifying 
information for the third-party poster, as OSPs are not obligated to 
retain this information. If the OSP does have the information the 
victim must compel its disclosure by court order through filing for a 
John Doe subpoena.255 A court will not issue this subpoena unless it 
determines that the victim can meet one of the various standards of 
review, depending on the rule in that jurisdiction. 
At this point, if not before, the anonymous poster will be given 
notice of the victim’s efforts to unmask him or her, and he or she will 
have an opportunity to respond with an opposition brief to quash the 
subpoena. The court will then make another determination on the 
subpoena. If is the court issues the subpoena, the victim may proceed 
on various tort grounds against the poster. Until this time, however, 
the victim will have no recourse for his or her injury, and he or she 
will have no leverage to remove the offending post. 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
A.  The Online Right to Autonomy of Identity 
An individual’s interest in “autonomous self-definition” is a 
central issue to any solution posed by cases like Barnes.256 In this 
respect, the right of publicity is the only right to autonomy of identity 
that courts have recognized as an exception to § 230 immunity.257 But 
to fall within this exception, a victim must show that the misuse or 
misappropriation of the victim’s identity was made “for purposes of 
trade or advertising.”258 This severe limitation on the scope of 
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infringement for which a victim can recover does not adequately 
account for the “emotional and economic” costs borne by victims 
whose interests in autonomous self-definition have been violated.259 
Though the state-law right of publicity as it stands today is 
inadequate to sufficiently protect user identity, the historical and 
theoretical underpinnings of the right of publicity tend to justify a 
right to autonomous self-definition.260 Moreover, the nature of the 
Web 2.0 environment necessitates a limited recognition of this right 
in order to protect the Internet users’ safety and interests and to 
uphold Congress’s intent in passing § 230—to protect the integrity, 
vitality, and diversity of the online community. 
Since 1890 when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first 
proposed that the right to privacy ought to be protected, it has 
become “one of the broadest concepts in the law,” supporting a wide 
array of interests and fostering little consensus as to its meaning as a 
legal concept.261 Unfortunately, courts have viewed identity 
misappropriation through the lens of privacy. As a result, they have 
considered it in light of Warren and Brandeis’s initial premise that 
the right to privacy found its basis in the individual’s fundamental 
interest in being “let alone.”262 However, claims regarding identity 
misappropriation are ill suited to this theoretical basis. Victims of 
identity misappropriation are not typically trying to be let alone to 
hide from public view. Rather, a victim is typically seeking to create 
a public image that the misappropriation undermines or 
contradicts.263 It was this kind of discrepancy that led to the creation 
of the right of publicity to begin with, in that being let alone did not 
fit the goals of public figures who were simultaneously seeking 
publicity in their own right.264 
The right of publicity was premised on a theory analogizing 
one’s right in one’s identity to a property right.265 However, property 
theory cannot adequately justify the right of publicity, as celebrity is 
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not a scarce resource in need of protection.266 Likewise, labor 
theories “overstate an individual’s role in the creation of any 
economic value in his or her public persona,”267 and the appropriation 
of a celebrity’s identity may be no more likely to exhaust the value 
of his or her identity than it is to increase the value.268 After all, as the 
adage states, all publicity is good publicity. Additionally, courts 
often apply the right of publicity in instances where plaintiffs have 
done nothing to cultivate their personas’ economic value and do not 
have an economic interest in exploiting whatever value their 
personas may hold.269 For these reasons, application of the right of 
publicity seems to be predicated not so much on the appropriation of 
economic value in identity but on appropriation of identity itself. If 
so, its key theoretical underpinning seems to be a right of autonomy 
of identity.270 
Claims such as those in Barnes and Perfect 10, Inc. should be 
premised on this fundamental theory. In those cases, the harm caused 
to the victim was not simply economic: it was harm to functional 
reputation, to the right of self-expression, to personal safety and 
security, and to the ability to participate freely online without 
obstruction. Furthermore, those harms did not stem solely from the 
fraudulent posts themselves but also from the failures to effectively 
remove them from the Internet. ISPs and OSPs today make money 
from Web 2.0’s identity-based participatory structure but do not 
shoulder their share of the burden in terms of liability.271 Courts 
should adopt a policy with respect to ISP immunity that recognizes 
the right to autonomy of identity as a state intellectual property 
exception like the right of publicity. This would maximize protection 
for victims and shift some of the burden to protect against 
infringement onto those in the best position to remedy its harm 
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through takedown. Such recognition would ensure better protection 
for online speech,272 Internet participation, and Internet development. 
B.  Limited Exception to ISP Distributor Liability 
Protection for the integrity of user identity is essential to Internet 
development and the development of other related interactive media 
and technology in the Web 2.0 era.273 Likewise, protections for 
“online discourse” and “cultural development,”274 which go hand in 
hand with protections against stalking and harassment online, are 
dependent on protection of user identity in Web 2.0.275 Therefore, for 
courts to accomplish Congress’s stated intention for § 230, they must 
rethink the Zeran interpretation of § 230.276 
Attempts to roll back § 230 immunity in order to remedy its 
inadequate protection have rarely been upheld277 and have been 
decried by commentators as a “deviation from the clearly stated 
goals of [the] statute and the accompanying consistent judicial 
interpretation.”278 Such commentary regards any encroachment on 
broad § 230 immunity as an affront to the beneficial policy of 
Internet exceptionalism, presumed to be central to the congressional 
policy underlying the CDA.279 Such criticism, however, overlooks 
the fact that courts initially granted broadened immunity that 
encompassed distributor liability as an expansion beyond the bounds 
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of the statutory language of § 230 for the purpose of accomplishing 
congressional intent.280 However, Congress did not necessarily intend 
this expansion.281 As such, a rollback of broad immunity, bringing 
the breadth of ISP immunity more in line with the statutory language 
of § 230, would accomplish Congress’s initial stated intent and 
respect congressional authority. Indeed, minor exceptions to broad 
§ 230 immunity do not sufficiently protect Internet users’ identities. 
Only wholesale elimination of immunity for notice-based distributor 
liability in those circumstances where a victim’s identity has been 
co-opted will effectively protect victims of identity misappropriation. 
Therefore, courts ought to recognize a particular exception from 
the general rule interpreting § 230 as immunizing ISPs and OSPs 
against distributor liability. ISPs and OSPs should be subject to 
notice-based liability for negligence in cases where (1) a third-party 
poster fraudulently misappropriates another user’s identity and 
makes a post as that individual (not merely about that individual);282 
(2) the user whose identity has been subjected to misappropriation 
has given the ISP or OSP notice that the posting is reasonably 
viewed as a misappropriation of his or her identity; and (3) the user 
requested that the posting be taken down. Critics may argue that any 
opening in ISP and OSP liability for third-party posting will chill 
online discourse,283 yet other nations, such as Britain and Ireland, do 
not offer immunity to ISPs, and those countries still benefit from 
“vibrant online discourse.”284 
Also, a distinction must be drawn between OSPs, which have 
control over the content on a particular website, and ISPs, such as 
broadband providers, which function more like common carriers and 
do not directly control webpages or platforms for public-content 
posting. ISPs that function like common carriers should not be 
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subject to distributor liability because Congress’s intent would not be 
furthered by removing Zeran immunity in these cases. However, 
because OSPs control content and are in the best position to protect 
Internet users from prolonged harm to their rights to autonomous 
self-definition and integrity of identity, OSPs ought to have a duty to 
take down the content in a reasonable amount of time. This duty 
should arise where the OSP has actual knowledge that material is 
reasonably infringing and the victim provides notice to the OSP.285 
The requirement that the victim provide notice to the OSP will 
safeguard OSPs against a duty to police every claimed violation and 
will ensure that the victim is, in fact, taking an active role in the 
construction and maintenance of his or her online identity. Lastly, a 
safe-harbor provision limiting this liability should also be enforced, 
though this may require congressional action, as no such provision is 
written into the CDA. 
C.  Notice and Takedown Safe-Harbor Provision 
Although, under the current system, a victim of identity 
misappropriation may bring suit directly against the third-party 
poster as recourse for damage done, such recourse has become 
increasingly difficult for reasons beyond those already discussed. 
There is software now on the market that allows users to “hide (or in 
the alternative, continuously change) their IP addresses.”286 As use of 
such software increases, a plaintiff’s ability to unmask an anonymous 
poster may become nearly impossible. Even without this 
technological advance, a third-party poster can avoid detection and 
eliminate the possibility of recourse against him or her by posting the 
material from a computer that does not identify him or her.287 
Likewise, even when a victim obtains a subpoena, unmasks and 
successfully sues the third-party poster, the harm will not have been 
eliminated because the post will have already been spread online 
over search archives, Internet caches, or in the original post (when 
the OSP refuses to dismantle it).288 Because such posts remain 
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viewable, they can, as in Barnes, serve as a “call[] to action” for 
more harassment.289 Therefore, even successful suits for damages 
against third-party posters will seldom be adequate remedies for 
victims. Furthermore, studies have shown that most plaintiffs would 
prefer to simply have the offending posts removed than to get money 
damages.290 Seventy-five percent of libel plaintiffs say they would 
have refrained from litigation if they had received a retraction, 
correction, or apology.291 Therefore, enforceable means of identity 
protection that require OSPs to take down identity-misappropriating 
posts would be more effective to remedy online infringement than 
the current suit-for-damages system. 
Such a system would require limited notice-based liability for 
OSPs. However, liability for failure to take down posts should trigger 
only when the notice has been properly provided. The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) serves as a good model for 
determining appropriate notice.292 Under the DMCA, a copyright 
holder must give written notification of claimed copyright 
infringement, identify the copyrighted work, identify the material 
claimed to be infringed, provide contact information for the 
copyright holder/victim, give a statement of good faith belief, and 
include a signature and statement of accuracy under penalty of 
perjury.293 Here, similar criteria for giving notice would be effective. 
As a preliminary matter, OSPs should be obligated to provide a 
means of contact by which notice can be filed. Only the victim or his 
or her agent should file notice with the OSP. The victim should be 
obligated to fill out a form certifying, on penalty of perjury, that (1) 
the victim is the individual whose identity has been appropriated in 
the offending post; (2) the victim has a good faith belief that the 
material in question has served to misappropriate his or her identity; 
and (3) the information in the victim’s notification is accurate to the 
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best of his or her knowledge. The victim should identify the 
particular elements of the post that arguably appropriate his or her 
identity and should therefore be removed. These specifications 
should be reasonably sufficient to permit the OSP to locate the 
material. The victim should offer reasonable documentation of how 
the elements of the post infringe on his or her identity. He or she 
should offer contact information reasonably sufficient to allow the 
OSP to contact him or her. If the OSP receives such notice, it would 
then have a reasonable duty of care to take down the offending post. 
Failure to exercise this reasonable duty of care should result in 
liability. Reasonable efforts to take down the offending material 
should result in safe harbor and immunity from suit. Of course, not 
all Internet media have easily manageable content.294 For this reason, 
an OSP ought to be held only to a reasonable standard of care to 
make efforts to remove the infringing post in a reasonable time after 
receiving notice. 
D.  Safeguards Against Misuse 
Scholars have noted that notice-and-takedown regimes such as 
ones like the DMCA’s “have not worked well” because they may 
“sweep too broadly,” causing OSPs to take down postings simply to 
avoid liability.295 Likewise, OSPs may lose a good deal of time and 
money investigating complaints.296 Such concerns are misplaced with 
respect to this proposed system, however, because they are narrowly 
drawn and personally driven. OSPs have no duty to remove simple 
references to an individual, nor are they duty-bound to remove 
allegedly defamatory postings that do not have third parties posing as 
the victim or giving out sensitive personal information. Also, 
individuals protecting their personal identities generally have less 
time and money than corporations protecting their intellectual 
property have. Individuals are therefore less likely to submit proper 
takedown requests to ISPs and OSPs for minor or questionable 
violations. 
Additional concerns with requiring OSP responsibility for 
takedowns crop up with respect to identity misappropriation claims 
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that stem from postings on sites that operate without a central 
administrator who has complete control over the website.297 In such 
instances, the OSP is not in a position to easily remove infringing 
material. These concerns are alleviated by the fact that an OSP is 
only obligated to make a reasonable effort to remove the offending 
material. 
E.  Limiting Online Anonymity 
OSP liability and a notice-and-takedown system would not 
completely alleviate the problem faced in Barnes, however. Because 
of the speed with which information spreads across the Internet, it is 
sometimes difficult to completely eliminate a harmful post.298 For 
this reason, it is also important to place limitations on Internet 
anonymity. To this end, ISPs and OSPs should be obligated to trace 
identifying information on each anonymous poster. This way, online 
anonymity could be preserved while the destructive actions resulting 
from the lack of accountability in anonymity would be held in 
check.299 
The technology for tracking anonymous Internet posters is 
already available and being used by ISPs and OSPs. ISPs routinely 
keep records of IP addresses for users.300 In addition to IP addresses, 
many websites use a software component called a “cookie.”301 
Because IP addresses often change, many OSPs use cookies to track 
users who access their sites from the same computer at different 
times.302 Between cookies and IP-address tracking, the technological 
framework is in place for tracking anonymous posters. However, 
ISPs and OSPs are not obligated to collect and store this information 
for any particular length of time, and there is no guarantee that an 
anonymous user will be traceable. ISPs and OSPs should be 
obligated to retain this information for a definite period of time and 
should be liable for the loss of this information when a John Doe 
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subpoena has issued so that there would be appropriate limits on 
anonymity. Such limits would abate the perception that harassers are 
untouchable. 
In addition to obligatory ISP and OSP retention of user-identity 
data, Congress should establish a uniform system for issuing John 
Doe subpoenas. However, until this is accomplished, the takedown 
provisions for identity misappropriation that are suggested in this 
Note should satisfy even the more stringent Dendrite standard. Due 
to obligations on ISPs and OSPs, identity would be traceable in the 
case of alleged identity misappropriation. Thus, ISPs and OSPs 
would be able to give notice to a Doe defendant facing a subpoena. 
Likewise, if a plaintiff has issued appropriate notice and request for 
removal, then the notice, the sworn statement, and the additional 
information collected and presented to the OSP should support the 
claim against the Doe defendant. 
Perhaps the greatest objection to traceable anonymity is that it 
constitutes de facto elimination of anonymity online and results in 
the hindrance of free speech. While this objection has merit, the 
methods and technology involved with tracing identity are already in 
place. The only change this Note suggests is a statutory obligation 
that ISPs and OSPs retain the information they are already tracking. 
Such an obligation may place a higher burden on smaller OSPs that 
allow third-party posting but do not actually track IP or cookie 
information. For these smaller OSPs, there are alternative methods 
for tracing identity. Many sites require registration by email in order 
to post. Such registration would suffice. 
Violating a user’s right to privacy online is the other great 
concern with imposing an obligation on ISPs and OSPs to collect 
information that could be used to create records of online activity. 
However, as Justice Douglas recognized, “[o]ne who enters any 
public place sacrifices some of his privacy.”303 Obligating ISPs and 
OSPs to retain identity-tracing data does not obligate them to track 
user activity or collect users’ personal information. Most information 
gathered using cookies and IP addresses is anonymous because these 
do not convey any personal information in their own right.304 
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V.  JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE STEPS 
This Note’s proposals would require courts to overrule the 
Zeran interpretation of distributor liability. This revision would 
require no action by Congress because congressional intent with the 
CDA is already clear; it was the judiciary that first drew a broad line 
around all ISP liability from § 230. Coverage of distributor liability 
is not addressed in § 230, and policy considerations favor eliminating 
immunity in the limited case of negligence for OSPs that, after 
notice, fail to remove identity-misappropriating material. Thus, 
courts would have discretion to distinguish ISPs that are like 
common carriers from OSPs that regulate content. While 
requirements for reasonable notice and takedown in these cases 
could also come from the courts, Congress or state legislatures are 
better suited to the task. 
This proposal’s other elements require legislative action. 
Congress should obligate ISPs and OSPs to retain identity-tracing 
records. Such legislation would serve a number of purposes, 
including many beyond this Note’s scope. The statute should place a 
duty of care on ISPs to retain basic identification records for a 
reasonable period of time. This duty would only attach to ISPs that 
permit third-party posting and only apply to those users who post 
content online. Such additions would fill the void left by Internet 
exceptionalism in protecting online identity. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Changes in Internet technology and culture have led to an online 
environment wherein user identity is an integral part and a driving 
force in the Internet’s discourse and development. As a result, it is 
imperative that courts rethink their approaches to CDA immunity 
and roll it back where it disfavors protections for the autonomy of 
Internet-user identity. Policy considerations—such as protections 
against harassment and stalking for users attempting to contribute 
and interact online—necessitate limits on online anonymity. ISPs are 
in the best position to aid users in regulating their online identities 
and to trace users who post infringing material. ISPs are also the 
greatest beneficiaries of Web 2.0’s identity-driven system. Therefore, 
ISPs must be made to bear a greater portion of the burden to protect 
users and maintain an environment of safe interaction online. 
 
